On May 17, 2010, then-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed a nuclear agreement with Iran and Turkey that surprised the world. The treaty provided for Iran to exchange its low-enriched uranium for more concentrated material from Russia or France, with Turkish mediation, and was signed in Tehran under the wary eyes of the United States. This diplomatic gesture didn’t come out of nowhere—it was part of a behind-the-scenes strategy being pieced together since 2006, with silent support from allied governments within the so-called São Paulo Forum axis.
Iran began to raise international concerns in 2006 when the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium and plutonium at its facilities. Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Tehran regime resisted inspections and rejected UN sanctions, escalating its rhetoric against the West. Meanwhile, Brazil was drawing closer to the Persian country under the guise of a so-called “peace diplomacy,” which in practice legitimized Iran’s nuclear program under the cover of civilian energy use.
Between 2007 and 2009, Iran continued expanding its centrifuges and defying UN resolutions. It was in this context that Lula, with support from Turkey, began stitching together a deal that could present Brazil as a global mediator. In 2010, the uranium swap proposal was finalized, and PT Senator Eduardo Suplicy even stated in the Senate that Lula had “scored a historic goal in foreign relations.” Lula also celebrated the release of a French teacher imprisoned for espionage in Iran, presenting it as a direct result of his diplomatic efforts.
What the United States saw as a deviation from international security guidelines, the Brazilian government treated as a diplomatic triumph. The UN called the agreement “encouraging,” but Washington and Berlin reacted coolly. To the Americans, Lula acted cynically, helping Iran buy time and gain international legitimacy without providing real guarantees that the nuclear program was not for military purposes. In the end, the agreement served more as political propaganda than a real solution to nuclear threats.
However, Brazil’s relationship with uranium didn’t end there. In 2024, Brazil once again drew international attention by allowing companies linked to China to purchase large tracts of land in areas containing uranium. This raised alarms among conservative sectors monitoring nuclear geopolitics. The country’s alignment with powers not allied with the West reveals a historical pattern of Brazil being used as an auxiliary piece in the ambitions of the China-Iran axis.
Brazil’s actions, supported by governments aligned with the São Paulo Forum, follow a familiar script: challenging U.S. interests, supporting authoritarian regimes, and presenting itself as a neutral intermediary—even when ideological motives are clear. Lulist foreign policy was never merely diplomatic—it is instrumental and aligned with global forces seeking to weaken U.S. influence.
Brazil did not start “playing with uranium” alongside Iran yesterday. What seems new is, in fact, a continuation of an agenda built over decades by governments aligned with the international left. Critical coverage of these moves is increasingly urgent, especially as the country again draws closer to opaque regimes while ignoring warnings from Western democracies.
Timeline: Iran's Uranium Enrichment, Brazil and Turkey’s Roles, and Deadlocks with the U.S. (2006–2010)
2006
November 2006
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases a confidential report indicating traces of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Iran.
- Iran announces plans to install 60,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges, defying Western accusations that it seeks nuclear weapons.
- The IAEA states it cannot guarantee Iran's program is peaceful due to inspection obstruction.
- The U.S. and allies push the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran, which refuses to halt enrichment.
2007–2009
International Diplomacy and Sanctions
- Iran continues expanding its nuclear program and centrifuge installations.
- The UN Security Council passes several resolutions imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions.
- The U.S. maintains a hardline stance, fearing military use of the program.
- Turkey and Brazil gain prominence in South-South diplomacy, presenting themselves as negotiators for a peaceful resolution.
2010
April/May 2010 – Brazil-Turkey-Iran Tripartite Agreement
- Brazil and Turkey act as mediators for a proposed nuclear agreement with Iran.
- The deal stipulates that Iran would send 1,200 kg of 3.5%-enriched uranium to Turkey, which would store and later enrich it further. In return, Iran would receive 20%-enriched uranium from Russia or France for use in reactors.
- The aim was to increase transparency and prevent military use, fostering international trust.
May 17, 2010 – Brazil’s Reaction
- Senator Eduardo Suplicy (PT) celebrates the agreement in the Senate, praising President Lula and Minister Celso Amorim’s diplomatic efforts.
- Suplicy hails the agreement as a major step toward Middle East peace, avoiding conflicts similar to Iraq.
- He also highlights the release of French teacher Florence Reiss, attributing it to Brazilian diplomatic negotiations.
International Reaction
- The UN sees the deal as encouraging.
- The U.S. and Germany express concern, doubting its effectiveness in preventing Iran’s nuclear proliferation.
- The U.S. maintains pressure for tougher sanctions and does not officially recognize the agreement as sufficient to ensure peace.
Motivations and Deadlocks
Brazil and Turkey's Motivations
- To act as independent mediators to prevent a Middle East war, especially after the 2003 Iraq invasion.
- To gain global diplomatic prominence and boost Brazil’s image as a peaceful leader in international negotiations.
- To defend Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy use under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- To promote dialogue and avoid destabilizing confrontations in the region.
Iran’s Motivations
- To develop nuclear technology for energy purposes amid rising domestic energy demands.
- To ensure technological and strategic autonomy.
- To strengthen its geopolitical position amid external pressure.
Deadlocks with the United States
- Distrust of Iran’s real intentions, fearing the program’s military use.
- Skepticism about the effectiveness of the Brazil-Turkey-Iran agreement in ensuring non-proliferation.
- Preference for harsher measures, including sanctions and possible military action.
- Disagreement over the roles of Brazil and Turkey, seen as less aligned with Western policy.
Source: Wayback Machine (for deleted sites)
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